“A SIMPLE SUCKING OF THE TEETH”: BECKETT, DANTE AND THE “RISUS PURUS” by Annett, Scott
 
 1 
“A SIMPLE SUCKING OF THE TEETH”: BECKETT, 
DANTE AND THE “RISUS PURUS” 
 




Samuel Beckett’s “Dante postcards” record the first three smiles to be found in the 
Purgatorio. In doing so, Becket draws attention to a gesture that has recently 
received significant critical attention within Dante studies. These postcards suggest 
Beckett’s alertness to the complexity of face to face encounters within the 
Commedia, while also providing an opportunity to consider the extent to which 
facial expressions are significant within Beckett’s own writing. In this essay, I 
argue that the postcards can be read alongside Beckett’s early novels, in particular 
Murphy (English 1938, French 1947) and Watt (English 1953, French 1968). 
Moreover, I explore the extent to which Beckett’s readings of Dante are 
multifaceted in that they demonstrate the extent to which he was both inspired by, 
and yet also at odds with, his Italian predecessor.  
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Samuel Beckett’s “Dante postcards”, which are held at Reading 
University Library, are clear evidence of his close and recurrent 
readings of the Commedia.1  These postcards consist of three 
undated, loose cards on which Beckett made some brief, 
handwritten notes. These notes include line-referenced 
quotations from the first five canti of the Purgatorio, Beckett’s 
 
1 “Dante postcards”, RUL, MS 4123. See also Beckett at Reading: Catalogue of 
the Beckett Manuscript Collection at The University of Reading, ed. by Bryden, 
Garforth and Peter (The University of Reading: Whiteknights Press and the 
Beckett Foundation). Dante’s significance to Beckett has been explored by a 
number of scholars, including in particular Daniella Caselli in Beckett’s Dantes: 
Intertextuality in the fiction and criticism (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2005).  
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own observations regarding the structure of the Commedia, and 
some extracts from an unattributed Italian commentary. They 
also record the first three smiles in the Purgatorio, and in doing 
so they bear witness to the tantalizing fact that smiles were a 
particular feature of Dante’s writing that had caught his attention.  
 Indeed, the sharpness of Beckett’s reading is corroborated 
by the scholars to have since argued that, within the Commedia, 
Dante transforms the smile into a key component of his poetic 
vocabulary. 2  This gesture is a site of precisely the kind of 
interpersonal acceptance and resistance to which both authors 
were sensitive. The first smile noted by Beckett is that of Dante’s 
old friend, Casella, in Purgatorio 2. Upon recognizing Casella, 
we are told that Dante advances to embrace him but that their 
embrace proves to be impossible (Purg. 2. 79-81):  
   
 Oi ombre vane, fuor che ne l’aspetto!  
 tre volte dietro a lei le mani avvinsi,  
 e tante mi tornai con esse al petto.                              
 
It is Dante’s wonder at their failure to embrace that causes 
Casella to smile: “Di maraviglia, credo, mi dipinsi; / per che 
l’ombra sorrise e si ritrasse.” (Purg. 2. 82-83) In this moment, 
Casella reads and interprets the expression on Dante’s face, in 
turn responding with a complex communicative gesture of his 
 
2  Sorriso/sorridere and riso/ridere are used interchangeably throughout the 
Commedia. See Hawkins, “All Smiles: Poetry and Theology in Dante” in Dante’s 
Commedia: Theology as Poetry, eds. Montemaggi and Treherne. Claudia Villa 
discusses the connections between Horace, ineffability and smiles in the Paradiso. 
Villa, “Il problema dello stile umile (e il riso di Dante)” in Dante the Lyric and 
Ethical Poet, ed. Barański and McLaughlin (Oxford: Legenda, 2010). Finally, see 




own: his smile simultaneously suggests recognition, intimacy 
and amusement at his friend’s confusion.  
 The second smile noted by Beckett occurs a canto later and 
is that of Manfred, the son of Emperor Frederick II. Manfred 
initially offers his wounds as identifying marks, before smiling 
(“Poi sorridendo”) and naming himself: “Io son Manfredi.” 
(Purg. 3. 111) Dante presents Manfred as an unusually attractive 
nobleman and in the postcards Beckett quotes from an 
unattributed critical work, which emphasises that “Manfredi è 
l’unico personaggio che Dante descrive nei suoi particolari felici 
mittendone in risalto la straordinaria bellezza.” Beckett then 
copies a line from Purgatorio 3: “biondo era e bello e di gentile 
aspetto.” (Purg. 3. 107) Crucially, the smiles of both Casella and 
Manfred occur when attention is drawn to the bodies of the 
purgatorial shades, while the smiles themselves act as modes of 
communication between individuals: Casella’s smile 
communicates amusement at Dante’s confusion as well as 
recognition of his friend, while Manfred’s expression is the 
reassuring smile of a stranger forming a social connection and 
perhaps also contains a hint of wry amusement at Dante’s initial 
failure to recognize him.  
 The third and final smile referenced by Beckett in his 
postcards is that of Dante himself, who smiles when he sees 
Belacqua seated beneath a rock midway up Mount Purgatory. 
Mary Bryden describes this smile as being prompted “both by the 
sudden recognition of his lutemaker friend and by a spontaneous 
amusement at his languid leg-pulling.”3 This smile is remarkable 
because it is, as Beckett notes in the postcards, “D’s 1st smile,” 
 
3 Bryden, “Beckett and the Three Dantean Smiles” in Journal of Beckett Studies, 




or as he will put it later in Compagnie / Company (1980), 
“Dante’s first quarter-smile.”4  Following his encounters with 
Casella and Manfred, Dante’s “quarter-smile” is a sign that he 
has once again become able to respond to other individuals with 
an expressive reciprocity and openness beyond the less delicate, 
and as Virgil makes clear in Inferno 20, less appropriate, 
expressions of pity presented in Hell.5 
 As mentioned above, Beckett’s “Dante postcards” are 
undated, and as such a degree of tentativeness is necessary when 
drawing specific texts into their orbit. At the same time, 
Beckett’s note-taking habits were particularly concentrated 
throughout the 1930s, and both John Pilling and Matthew 
Feldman have demonstrated the interconnectedness between 
Beckett’s notes and the texts written in this period.6 With this in 
mind, and without attempting to pin a specific date to the 
postcards, this essay suggests that the notes were taken early in 
Beckett’s career, most likely in the mid-1930s, and that they were 
influential in shaping the issues examined in two of his early 
 
4 Beckett, Company (London: Calder, 1980, repr. 2003), p. 85. 
5 See Inf. 5. 139-142 and Inf. 20. 25-27. 
6 See The Ideal Core of the Onion: Reading Beckett Archives, ed. by Pilling and 
Bryden (Reading: Beckett International Foundation, 1992) and Pilling’s article 
“Dates and Difficulties, Beckett’s Whoroscope Notebook,” in Beckett the 
European, ed. by Van Hulle (Tallahassee, Florida: Journal of Beckett Studies 
Books, 2005). See also Feldman’s Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of Samuel 
Beckett’s ‘Interwar Notes’ (London; New York: Continuum, 2006, repr. 2008) and 
Samuel Beckett: Debts and Legacies, ed. by Tonning, Feldman, Engelberts, van 








novels: Murphy (English 1938, French 1947) and Watt (English 
1953, French 1968). Both of these texts pay considerable 
attention to faces and facial expressions, reflecting upon a 
number of the questions posed implicitly by the postcards.  
 On the second page of Murphy, there is an account of the 
eponymous hero’s farewell from Neary, a man under whom he 
“had lately studied”:  
 
  “Murphy, all life is figure and ground.” 
  “But a wandering to find home,” said Murphy. 
  “The face,” said Neary, “or system of faces, against the big 
blooming buzzing confusion. I think of Miss Dwyer.”7 
 
John Fletcher places Neary’s assertion that “all life is figure and 
ground” in the context of pre-Socratic philosophy,8 but James 
Acheson more convincingly argues that Neary’s contribution to 
the exchange is based on the work of “two famous psychologists, 
Edgar Rubin and William James.”9 By arguing that “all life is 
figure and ground,” Neary alludes to Rubin’s argument that “we 
make sense of sense data by distinguishing perceptually between 
‘the figure, the substantial appearance of objects, and the ground, 
the [...] environment in which [objects are] placed’”.10 As such, 
Neary claims that what we see in “life” depends on the way in 
which we see; each individual attempts to make sense of the 
world by distinguishing between an object and its surroundings, 
 
7 Beckett, Murphy (London: Calder, 1963, repr. 1993), p. 6. 
8  Fletcher, ‘Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers’ in Comparative Literature, 
vol.17: 1 (Winter, 1965), p. 43. 
9  Acheson, ‘Murphy’s Metaphysics’, in The Beckett Studies Reader, ed. S.E. 
Gontarski (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 80. 
10 Ibid. Acheson is quoting Robert I. Watson, The Great Psychologists: From 
Aristotle to Freud, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), p. 439. 
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by deciding what to focus on amidst the confusion. 
 Murphy’s reply to Neary could be heard as a qualification, 
so that “all life” may well be “figure and ground” except for “a 
wandering to find home,” or it may be an alternative conclusion 
to the formulation “all life is,” implying that for Murphy “all life 
is [...] But a wandering to find home,” that is, “all life” is nothing 
more than a “wandering to find home.” In either case, this is an 
admission of dislocation: the one definite truth for Murphy is that 
“all life” consists of a search for “home.” Neary’s response to 
Murphy’s assertion can be heard either as a dismissal, so that 
Neary ignores Murphy as he continues with his own train of 
thought, or as a further nuancing, so that Neary suggests “home” 
is in fact the “face” or “system of faces.” By changing our 
perspectives, Neary may imply, it is possible to render the “face” 
or “system of faces” a point (or points) of orientation “against” 
the “big blooming buzzing confusion” in the background. 
 Neary’s emphasis on the “face” may provide an alternative 
to the solipsism and self-love in which Murphy indulges 
throughout the novel.11 In doing so, Neary calls to mind the later 
work of Emmanuel Levinas, of whom Robert Gordon writes: 
“the roots of the ethical lie in the encounter between two people, 
each looking at the other, acknowledging and recognizing the 
other, in particular acknowledging the ‘otherness’ of the other.” 
Gordon continues: “Two subjects enter the realm of the ethical 
in the act of facing each other, of facing up to each other and their 
own ethical subjecthood, of asking for a mark of the self in the 
 
11 See in particular Chapter 6 of Murphy, on Murphy’s mind, which includes the 
epigraph: “Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat.” Beckett, Murphy, 
p.63. This phrase has its origins in the writings of both Spinoza and Geulincx. See 




other and vice versa: what Levinas calls the ‘face to face’”.12 This 
“‘face to face’” encounter is a forceful summoning, indeed it is a 
summoning “prior to ontology and thus prior to the very 
foundations of the Western philosophical tradition and its notion 
of the self.”13  
 For Levinas, thought “alert to the face of the other” is the 
“thought of irreducible difference,” and this awareness of alterity 
is so radical that it demands both a response and an 
acknowledgement of responsibility. 14  In Éthique comme 
philosophie première, Levinas argues that “C’est précisément 
dans ce rappel de ma responsabilité par le visage qui m’assigne, 
qui me demande, qui me réclame, c’est dans cette mise en 
question qu’autrui est prochain.”15 The progression in Levinas’s 
sentence from a summoning, to a call and finally a plaintive 
request (“qui me réclame”) emphasises the complexity of this 
encounter, the extent to which it is double-sided, uncertain and 
yet at the same time irreducible.  
 For Neary, the “face” or “system of faces” is mentioned 
with Miss Dwyer in mind and the conversation between the two 
men develops into a discussion about love, and then Murphy’s 
apparent incapacity to love. Neary admits that “To gain the 
affections of Miss Dwyer [...] would benefit me no end,” to 
which Murphy retorts: “And then? [...] Back to Tenerife and the 
 
12 Gordon, Primo Levi’s Ordinary Virtues: From Testimony to Ethics (Oxford: 
OUP, 2001), p. 40. 
13 Ibid., pp. 18-19.  
14  Levinas, ‘Beyond Intentionality’, Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan 
Montefiore (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), p. 108. 
15 Levinas, Éthique comme philosophie première, préfacé et annoté par Jacques 




apes?” 16  In preparing his psychology notes while living in 
London between December 1933 and December 1935, Beckett 
read both Robert Woodworth’s Contemporary Schools of 
Psychology (1931) and Wolfgang Köhler’s The Mentality of 
Apes (1927), making notes on Köhler’s experiments with apes in 
Tenerife between 1913 and 1917.17 In mentioning “Tenerife and 
the apes,” Murphy refers to Köhler’s experiments, which led, as 
Shane Weller explains, to Köhler challenging “E. L. Thorndike’s 
argument that, unlike human beings, ‘Animals learn, neither by 
reasoning nor by imitation, but by trial and error’”: 
 
In his The Mentality of Apes (1917; English translation, 1925), Köhler 
addresses the question of “whether the chimpanzee, representing 
probably the most intelligent group of subhuman animals, showed any 
genuine intelligence” (Woodworth 142). His conclusion is that in fact 
apes learn not simply through “trial and error” (transcribed by Beckett 
as “trial and terror”) but also through “insight.” 
 
There is an irony in Murphy’s choice of reference because, as 
Weller goes on to observe, “for Köhler, the strict Cartesian 
distinction between human and animal is simply untenable.”18 
Murphy attempts to maintain a split between body and mind, to 
 
16 Beckett, Murphy, p. 7. 
17 Woodworth, Contemporary School’s of Psychology (London: Methuen, 1931); 
Köhler, The Mentality of Apes (2nd rev. ed. London: K. Paul Trench, Trübner & 
Co., 1927). See TCD MS 10971/7 and 10971/8. These notes are dated between 
December 1933 and December 1935, which was when Beckett began writing 
Murphy. See also Notes Diverse Holo: Catalogues of Beckett’s reading notes and 
other manuscripts at Trinity College Dublin, ed. Matthijs Engelberts and Everett 
Frost (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi Press, 2006), pp. 158-66. 
18 Weller, ‘Not Rightly Human: Beckett and Animality’ in Borderless Beckett / 




seek refuge in his “little world” by appeasing his body and 
avoiding the “big world,” and yet at the same time he also cites a 
text (whether consciously or not) that disputes the claims of 
Descartes.19  
 Nevertheless, the primary sense in which Murphy refers to 
the apes is to compare Neary’s desire for Miss Dwyer to an ape’s 
desire for a banana, which in turn casts doubt upon the wider, 
metaphysical significance of love:  
   
Of such was Neary’s love for Miss Dwyer, who loved a Flight-
Lieutenant Elliman, who loved a Miss Farren of Ringsakiddy, who 
loved a Father Fitt of Ballinclashet, who in all sincerity was bound to 
acknowledge a certain vocation for a Mrs West of Passage, who loved 
Neary. 
  “Love requited,” said Neary, “is a short circuit,” a ball that 
gave rise to a sparkling rally. 
  “The love that lifts up its eyes,” said Neary, “being in 
torment; that craves for the tip of her little finger, dipped in lacquer, 
to cool its tongue - is foreign to you, Murphy, I take it.” 
  “Greek,” said Murphy. 
  “Or put it another way,” said Neary; “the single, brilliant, 
organized compact blotch in the tumult of heterogeneous 
stimulation.”  
  “Blotch is the word,” said Murphy. 
  “Just so,” said Neary. “Now pay attention to this. For 
whatever reason you cannot love - But there is a Miss Counihan, 
Murphy, is there not?”20  
 
The “blotch” referred to by Neary might be a face set against the 
background of “heterogeneous stimulation,” while Murphy’s 
attentiveness to Neary’s terms (“Blotch is the word”) emphasises 
 
19 Beckett, Murphy, p. 101. 
20 Ibid., p. 7. 
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his own reluctance to engage in such messy, interpersonal 
encounters. Murphy agrees that love as described by Neary is 
foreign to him (“Greek”) and Neary concludes by acknowledging 
that for “whatever reason,” Murphy “cannot love.” In fact, he 
seems to prove as much by asking Murphy “to define let us say 
your commerce with this Miss Counihan.” Murphy replies, 
“Precordial [..] rather than cordial. Tired. Cork County. 
Depraved.” Neary acknowledges that Murphy’s “heart is as it is,” 
musing that his “conarium” or pineal gland may well have 
“shrunk to nothing,”21 the “conarium” being for Descartes the 
point of connection between body and mind and so, as Descartes 
puts it himself, the “principle seat of the soul.”22 In Neary’s view, 
the connection between Murphy’s body and mind has been 
utterly severed, while he may also be implying (depending on 
how well he knows his Descartes) that Murphy is literally soul-
less.  
 Yet Neary’s question regarding Miss Counihan is the 
correct one. For while Murphy may have no feelings for Miss 
Counihan, he is not without feelings altogether: “The part of him 
that he hated craved for Celia, the part that he loved shriveled up 
at the thought of her. The voice lamented faintly against his 
flesh.”23 In contrast to Neary’s suggestion, Murphy’s “conarium” 
cannot have “shrunk to nothing”; his mind and body remain in 
tension, his consciousness (“voice”) lamenting “faintly against 
his flesh.” A little later, Celia discovers Murphy tied to his chair 
but now with “the rocking-chair [...] on top”:  
 
21 Ibid., p. 8. 
22 This phrase is taken from a letter that Descartes wrote on 29th January 1640. 
Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, 
trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, Kenny (Cambridge: CUP, 1991). p. 143. 




“Who are you?” said Murphy. Celia mentioned her name. Murphy, 
unable to believe his ears, opened his eyes. The beloved features 
emerging from chaos were the face against the big blooming buzzing 
confusion of which Neary had spoken so highly. He closed his eyes 
and opened his arms. She sank down athwart his breast, their heads 
were side by side on the pillow but facing opposite ways, his fingers 
strayed through her yellow hair. It was the short circuit so earnestly 
desired by Neary, the flare of pursuit and flight extinguished.24  
 
In Murphy’s terms, Celia’s “beloved features” emerge “from 
chaos,” and he goes on to acknowledge the equivalence of this 
experience with Neary’s earlier description: the “beloved 
features emerging from the chaos were the face against the big 
blooming buzzing confusion of which Neary had spoken so 
highly.” Despite his own resistance, Murphy has found a ‘figure’ 
(Celia’s face) against the ‘ground’ (the ‘chaos’).  
 It would seem then that an individual might orientate 
herself amidst the chaos of experience by attending closely to the 
faces of others. However, such attention is not straightforwardly 
positive; rather it contains a “mixture” of responses, much as 
Beckett himself described when outlining his own attitude to 
Murphy: “the mixture of compassion, patience, mockery and ‘tat 
twam asi.’” 25  A look of exactly this kind occurs when Celia 
encounters Miss Carridge: 
 
A long look of fellow-feeling filled the space between them, with 
calm, pity and a touch of contempt. They leaned against it as against 
 
24 Ibid., pp. 20-1. 
25 The phrase ‘tat twam asi’ is from Sanskrit, meaning ‘That thou art’. Beckett, The 
Letters of Samuel Beckett: 1929-1940, vol. I., ed. Fehsenfeld, Overbeck 




a solid wall of wool and looked at each other across it. Then they 
continued on their ways, Miss Carridge down what stairs remained, 
Celia into their old room.26  
 
The look shared by Miss Carridge and Celia is simultaneously a 
look of acceptance and resistance. The sympathetic act of 
“fellow-feeling” exchanged between these women does not 
consist of a look of pure pity but rather is mingled with a “touch 
of contempt.” There is something supportive about the “wall of 
wool” against which they lean, something soft and comforting, 
and yet it is also divisive, indistinct, “solid.”   
 Discussing individuals and individualism in the Inferno, 
Robin Kirkpatrick and George Corbett describe the “paradoxical 
state in which the self exiles itself from self precisely by self-
absorption,” which fits Murphy’s self-love precisely.27  David 
Tucker observes that Murphy’s “egotistical self-regard will get 
the better of him and when his own little inferno engulfs him it 
will be while he is in thrall to himself and his self-defeating 
attempts to will his own quietist will-lessness.” 28  In the 
Purgatorio, in contrast to such “self-absorption,” there is 
suddenly an abundance of reciprocated facial expressions, and 
Kirkpatrick has drawn attention to the implications of such 
expressive detail, arguing that the body in Dante’s Purgatorio 
becomes, “as the Talmudic philosopher Emmanuel Levinas 
 
26 Beckett, Murphy, p. 71. 
27 Kirkpatrick and Corbett, “Language, Narrative and Ethics” in Dante the Lyric 
and Ethical Poet, p. 59. 
28 Tucker, “Murphy, Geulincx and an Occasional(ist) Game of Chess” in The 
Tragic Comedy of Samuel Beckett: ‘Beckett in Rome’, 17-19 April 2008 




would have it, all face.”29 In turn, this face-fullness is grounded 
“in the expressive reciprocations of face recognizing face.”30  
 The point of transition in the Commedia between infernal 
self-absorption and purgatorial reciprocation is clear. At the end 
of Purgatorio 1, Dante’s face is washed by Virgil (Purg. 1. 126-
129): 
 
 ond’io, che fui accorto di sua arte, 
     porsi ver lui le guance lagrimose: 
 ivi mi fece tutto discoverto 
 quel color che l’inferno mi nascose.     
         
By removing the dust and tears from Dante’s face, Virgil washes 
away traces of the Inferno, and through this tender and intimate 
act he rejuvenates Dante in preparation for the journey to come. 
To borrow Bryden’s phrase, the atmosphere of the Ante-
Purgatory will incorporate “both light and shade, grief and 
cheerfulness,”31 and the emotional and physical qualities of this 
recognizably terrestrial setting are expressed largely through a 
renewed emphasis on bodies, in particular Dante’s miraculously 
solid body,32 but also the physical forms of the shades he meets 
as he ascends the mountain. As such, it is clear that Beckett was 
alert to the “mixture” to be discerned in Dante’s purgatorial 
faces, to the extent to which the “muscular dialogue generated by 
gesture” might include a variety of possible emotions and 
 
29 Kirkpatrick and Corbett, “Language, Narrative and Ethics,” p. 59. 
30 Kirkpatrick, “Dante and the Body” in Framing Medieval Bodies, eds. Kay and 
Rubin (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994), p. 247. 
31 Bryden, “Beckett and the Three Dantean Smiles”, p. 31.  




meanings.33And in this respect, Beckett was also aware of a 
fundamental problem, also implicit but not developed in the 
moments noted in the Purgatorio: if face to face encounters offer 
an ethical alternative to solipsism and isolation, then they are also 
precarious, fraught with potential misunderstanding and 
achieved against the odds.  
 In Watt, Arthur describes the academic committee before 
whom Louit must present his findings, elaborately outlining the 
series of incomplete “looks” passed between the members of the 
committee by explaining that “many, many looks may still be 
taken, and much, much time still lost, ere every eye find the eye 
it seeks, and into every mind the energy flow, the comfort and 
the reassurance, necessary for a resumption of the business in 
hand.” A reciprocated look enables “energy” to “flow”, and such 
energy is both a “comfort” and a “reassurance,” but “of the five 
times eight or forty looks taken, not one” is “reciprocated.”34 
Following the meeting, Arthur describes the committee members 
leaving the room, followed by Louit and Mr. Nackybal:  
 
And soon after Mr. Nackybal put on his outer clothes and went away. 
And soon after Louit went away. And Louit, going down the stairs, 
met the bitter stout porter Power coming up. And as they passed the 
porter raised his cap and Louit smiled. And they did well. For had not 
Louit smiled, then Power had not raised his cap, and had not Power 
raised his cap, then Louit had not smiled, but they had passed, each 
on his way, Louit down, Power up, the one unsmiling, and the other 
covered.35 
 
33  In 1931, while lecturing on Molière at Trinity College Dublin, Beckett 
emphasized “muscular dialogue generated by gesture.” Knowlson, Damned to 
Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996, repr. 1997), p. 56.  
34 Beckett, Watt (London: Calder, 1963, repr. 1998), p. 177. 
35 Ibid., p. 196. 
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The comedy in this passage is created through the way in which 
Arthur reduces the incident to the barest of facts, while also 
suggesting that, logically, Louit and the porter Power could 
easily not have responded to one another. Each act is dependent 
upon the other happening, which in turn draws our attention to 
the unlikeliness of simultaneous reciprocity. Reciprocity of this 
kind is undoubtedly valuable (“And they did well”) but, in the 
context of Beckett’s writing, successful, communicative 
interactions such as those described in the opening canti of the 
Purgatorio are most likely accidental, the result of two 
individuals each happening to find a “figure” against the 
“ground.”36  
 Moreover, the difficulty of expressive reciprocity is such 
that even if the problem of timing is overcome, the 
communication of meaning cannot be relied upon. In Dream of 
Fair to Middling Women (1992), the narrator describes Lucien’s 
strange, indirect manner of speaking (“he did not talk at a person, 
he just balladed around at his own sweet aboulia”), and we are 
then provided with a brief example of such speech: 
 
“A passage in Liebnitz” he said “where he compares matter to a 
garden of flowers and every corpuscle of every fish another pool of 
fish ...” he essayed the gesture and smiled, a drowned smile, “gave me 
the impression that Æsthetics were a branch of philosophy.”37 
 
Lucien must “essay” the gesture, by which the narrator means try 
 
36 Beckett, Murphy, p. 6. 
37 Beckett, Dream of Fair to Middling Women, ed. O’Brien and Fournier (London: 
Calder, 1993), p. 47. Despite being written in the early 1930s, Dream of Fair to 
Middling Women was not published until 1992. 
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or attempt, and the result is an undoubted failure: “a drowned 
smile.” The narrator goes on to describe the smile as “terrible, as 
though seen through water,” and claims that on the one hand 
“Belacqua wanted to sponge it away,” while on the other Lucien 
“would not abandon the gesture that had broken down and now 
could never be made to mean anything.” The smile is essential to 
Lucien, he “would not abandon it,” but it is meaningless, and its 
effect on Belacqua is to render him uncomfortable enough to 
want to erase it.  
  Similarly, at the beginning of Watt we learn that “Watt 
had watched people smile and thought he understood how it was 
done”: 
 
And it was true that Watt’s smile, when he smiled, resembled more a 
smile than a sneer, for example, or a yawn. But there was something 
wanting to Watt’s smile, some little thing was lacking, and people 
who saw it for the first time, and most people who saw it saw it for 
the first time, were sometimes in doubt as to what expression exactly 
was intended. To many it seemed a simple sucking of the teeth.  
 
This passage is concluded with a further, single sentence 
paragraph which informs us that “Watt used this smile 
sparingly.”38 Watt cannot imbue his smile with meaning in the 
way that Manfred does in Purgatorio 3. Watching others smile, 
no matter how attentively, is not enough for Watt to master the 
gesture himself, and the result is that, more often than not, the 
people who witness Watt’s smile are left confused. Watt’s 
tendency to pull faces at strangers is an example of “la plus 
intense drôlerie” noticed by Badiou in Beckett’s writing; the act 
 




is funny, but it is also disconcerting, an example of the subject’s 
dislocation from the external world.39  
 In fact, we learn a little later that Watt’s smile at times even 
communicates the opposite message to that intended. Having sat 
down in a compartment of a train, Watt notices “a large 
gentleman sitting in the corner diagonally opposed to his.” This 
man introduces himself (“My name is Spiro”) and we are 
informed that Watt is pleased that, in Mr. Spiro, he has finally 
met a “sensible man” who begins with the “essential and then, 
working on, would deal with the less important matters, one after 
the other, in an orderly way.” In order to reflect his pleasure at 
this good sense, the narrator tells us that “Watt smiled,” and there 
is a beat as we move to the next line where we learn the effect of 
Watt’s smile: “No offence meant, said Mr. Spiro”. 40  In this 
moment, Beckett demonstrates both Watt’s solitude (he cannot 
communicate with Mr. Spiro), as well as the futility of hermetic 
language (the communicative failure is a result of the 
particularity of Watt’s facial expression). In the “Verticalist 
Manifesto” that Beckett signed in 1932, the signatories attested 
to their willingness to “go so far as to invent a hermetic language, 
if necessary.”41 By the time he writes Watt, Beckett embodies the 
ugliness and painful loneliness of such a language in the gestural 
failures of his protagonist.  
 At the end of the novel, when Watt is about to leave Mr. 
Knott’s house, Watt’s face is said to become “gradually of such 
vacancy that Micks, raising in amaze an astonished hand to a 
thunderstruck mouth, recoiled to the wall, and there stood, in a 
 
39 Badiou, Beckett: L’Increvable désir (Paris: Hachette, 1995), p. 74.  
40 Beckett, Watt, p. 25. 
41 Macmillan, Transition 1927-38: History of a Literary Era (London: John Calder, 
1975), p. 66.  
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crouching posture, his back pressed against the wall, and the back 
of the one hand pressed against his parted lips.” Close attention 
to Watt’s face renders Micks “astonished” and “thunderstruck” 
in such a surprising fashion that the narrator even suggests it 
“may have been something else”:  
 
[I]t is hard to believe that the face of Watt, dreadful and all as it was 
at the time, was dreadful and all enough to cause a powerful lymphatic 
man like Micks to recoil to the wall with his hands to his face, as if to 
ward off a blow, or press back a cry, in the way he did, and to turn 
pale, for he turned pale, very properly.42  
 
Despite the narrator’s misgivings, the reader is in little doubt that 
the cause of Micks’s reaction is Watt’s face, as the narrator 
himself partly acknowledges by noting that his face turned pale 
“very properly,” and so to speak, understandably. This instance 
of close attention results neither in a social connection nor an 
ethical relation to the other, but rather amazement, fear and 
paralysis. 
 In witnessing the vacancy of Watt’s expression, Micks 
comes, quite literally, face to face with the strangeness of 
humanity, which is to say, our capacity to become 
unrecognizable to one another. There is a similarly disconcerting 
moment towards the end of Murphy. Following their game of 
chess, Murphy helps Mr Endon to bed. In doing so, Murphy 
looks long into his opponent’s eyes, bringing his face so close to 
Mr Endon’s face that they almost touch. Peter Boxall writes: 
 
Murphy positions himself right in front of Mr Endon - we are 
told that he “took Mr Endon’s head in his hands and brought the 
 
42 Beckett, Watt, p. 219. 
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eyes to bear on his, or rather his on them, across a narrow gulf 
of air, the merest hand’s breadth of air” (Beckett, 1973, 139) - 
and as he gazes into Mr Endon’s empty eyes, the focus of the 
narrative is on the surface of the eyeball itself, the threshold 
which negotiates the contact between the minds of Murphy and 
Mr Endon. “Approaching his eyes still nearer,” the narrative 
goes on, Murphy focuses with intensity on the eyeball, 
discovering not ingress to the other, but rather a reflected 
version of himself, finding “in the cornea, horribly reduced, 
obscured and distorted, his own image” (Beckett, 1973, 140). 
The reflective surface of Mr Endon’s eye […] signals the 
impenetrability of the threshold of vision, its impassability.43  
 
There is no way through the material surface of Mr Endon’s eye, 
and no way of accessing his mind. The “narrow gulf of air,” small 
enough to suggest a “butterfly kiss” between the two men, is still 
too large.44 And yet a connection is made. In seeing himself 
“blindly reflected in Mr Endon’s eye,” Murphy finds himself “at 
home within the solipsism of the other.”  
 By becoming a “speck in Mr Endon’s unseen,” Murphy 
crosses the “gulf,” but as Boxall argues, this is “only because that 
wall is so glassily intact, only because this becoming other is also 
a peculiarly radical distancing from the other.”45 To return to 
Robert Gordon’s phrase, he finds, quite literally, “a mark of the 
self in the other,” but that mark is dependent upon inescapable 
isolation. 46  Levinas articulates this two-way movement in 
“Beyond Intentionality” by exclaiming, “A brother despite my 
 
43 Boxall, “The Threshold of Vision: The Animal Gaze in Beckett, Coetzee and 
Sebald,” Journal of Beckett Studies, volume 20: 2 (2011), p. 133.   
44 Beckett, Murphy, pp. 139-40. 
45 Boxall, “The Threshold of Vision,” p. 136.   




strangeness!” 47 Murphy’s strangeness, his alterity to Mr Endon, 
is absolute, but in that alterity he discovers a kind of brotherhood. 
 In the Commedia, Dante demonstrates remarkable subtlety 
in his handling of face to face encounters; a later example from 
the Purgatorio would be Dante’s own smile at Statius’ praise for 
Virgil, which is powerful in its simultaneous communication of 
human awkwardness, amusement and generosity (Purg. 21. 
109). Reflecting upon Dante’s work, Beckett stresses in both 
Murphy and Watt that it is too easy to suggest that we build 
ethical connections simply by looking closely at the faces of 
others. Every look runs the risk of misunderstanding, while each 
smile or laugh contains a “mixture of compassion, patience [and] 
mockery.”48  However, Dante’s poem does insist increasingly 
upon the possibility that alterity might be transformed into 
perfect community, so that by the time Dante encounters the 
souls of the just in Paradiso, those individuals are able to speak 
at once singularly and in unison: “e sonar ne la voce e ‘io’ e 
‘mio’, / quand’ era nel concetto e ‘noi’ e ‘nostro’ (Par. 19. 11-
12). Such perfect community is not possible in Beckett’s writing, 
and this points to a fundamental difference between the two 
authors and their understanding of the reality of human 
experience, which in turn helps to explicate the different kinds of 
comedy (and so laughter) created.  
 Having just arrived at Mr Knott’s house, Watt is provided 
with a “short statement” of advice by the outgoing servant, 
Arsene, and this piece of advice touches upon the range of 
different laughs available to an individual in response to the 
“whacks, the moans, the cracks, the groans, the welts, the 
 
47 Levinas, ‘Beyond Intentionality’, p. 110. 




squeaks, the belts, the shrieks, the pricks, the prayers, the kicks, 
the tears, the skelps, and the yelps.” 49 He explains:  
 
Of all the laughs that strictly speaking are not laughs, but modes of 
ululation, only three I think need detain us, I mean the bitter, the 
hollow and the mirthless. They correspond to successive, how shall I 
say successive ... suc ... successive excoriations of the understanding, 
and the passage from the one to the other is the passage from the lesser 
to the greater, from the lower to the higher, from the outer to the inner, 
from the gross to the fine, from the matter to the form. That laugh that 
now is mirthless once was hollow, the laugh that once was hollow 
once was bitter. And the laugh that once was bitter? Eyewater, Mr. 
Watt, eyewater. But do not let us waste our time with that, do not let 
us waste any more time with that, Mr. Watt. No. Where were we? The 
bitter, the hollow and - haw! haw! - the mirthless. The bitter laugh 
laughs at that which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not good! 
Not true! Well well. But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, 
down the snout - haw! - so. It is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, 
the laugh laughing at the laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the 
highest joke, in a word the laugh that laughs - silence please - at that 
which is unhappy.50 
 
Arsene does not mention laughter that is joyful. His insistence 
that there is a progression, along with his refusal to “waste any 
more time” on the laugh that “once was bitter,” implies that such 
laughter precedes the bitter laugh and as such is no longer worth 
discussing. The various laughs to which he refers are ways of 
shrieking or wailing (“modes of ululation”) and they “correspond 
to successive [...] excoriations of understanding.” They are a kind 
of epistemological “flaying” in which levels of “understanding” 
 
49 Beckett, Watt, p. 37. 




are painfully removed until unhappiness (“that which is 
unhappy”) is finally beheld.51 
 Arsene’s “risus purus” has been read as an attempt to 
escape suffering by moving beyond intellectual and moral 
frameworks (“Not good! Not true!”), and in such readings it has 
been suggested that through laughter it is possible to perceive the 
human situation more clearly, much as Chaucer’s Troilus does, 
from the vantage point of the “eighthe spere”, 52 following his 
death and at the conclusion of Troilus and Criseyde: “And in 
himself he lough right at the wo.” 53 This is how Simon Critchley 
handles the term in his conclusion to On Humour: 
 
For me, it is this smile - deriding the having and the not having, the 
pleasure and the pain, the sublimity and suffering of the human 
situation - that is the essence of humour. This is the risus purus, the 
highest laugh, the laugh that laughs at the laugh, that laughs at that 
which is unhappy, the mirthless laugh of the epigraph to this book. 
Yet, this smile does not bring unhappiness, but rather elevation and 
liberation, the lucidity of consolation. This is why, melancholy 
animals that we are, human beings are also the most cheerful. We 
smile and find ourselves ridiculous. Our wretchedness is our 
greatness.54 
 
It could be that Arsene is suggesting a way of stepping outside or 
beyond suffering, a way of self-reflexively contemplating 
unhappiness through a laugh or smile that brings, as Critchley 
 
51 OED. 1. The action of excoriating; the state of being excoriated: a. the action or 
process of flaying (a man or beast (obs.)). 
52 Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Benson (Oxford: 
OUP, 1987, repr. 1988), p. 584, line 1809. 
53 Ibid., line 1821. 




puts it, “elevation and liberation, the lucidity of consolation.” If 
this were the case, Arsene would be in good company, for 
evidence of just such thinking can also be found in the writing of 
Georges Bataille, who claims in Le Coupable (1961) that “Rire 
de l’univers libérait ma vie. J’échappe à la pesanteur en riant.”55 
 However, both Bataille and Critchley are in danger of 
implying that laughter is a means of salvation for humanity, a 
way of making suffering (or “wretchedness”) bearable. This is 
particularly the case if too much emphasis is placed on the final 
sentence of Critchley’s book: “Our wretchedness is our 
greatness.” In On Humour this quotation stands alone and 
unacknowledged, but in an interview with Shirley Dent, 
Critchley explains its origins and reasons for inclusion:  
 
It's a quotation from Pascal. I've always been very keen on Pascal, and 
what I'm most keen on in Pascal is his emphasis upon human 
wretchedness. He has a phrase which goes something like “Anxiety, 
boredom and inconstancy, that is the human condition” and I've 
always been very partial to that. But obviously for Pascal the flip side 
of that is religious experience, that experience of God that would 
transform or redeem your wretchedness. I've long wanted to have an 
occasion to include it in something I wrote and that's why it's there.56 
 
Critchley claims that there is a redemptive or transformative 
“side” to Pascal, a sense in which the wretchedness of humanity 
can in some way be seen afresh as a cause for celebration. This 
may be the case for Pascal but it is not so for Beckett. While there 
may be, as Critchley goes on to argue in the interview, “a black 
 
55 Bataille, Le Coupable (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 31. 
56 “Culture Wars” is the reviews website of the Institute of Ideas (IOI) in London. 




sun at the heart of the coloured universe,” and so “something 
melancholy at the heart of humour,” for Beckett the mixture of 
melancholia and comedy never permits avoidance of the human 
reality. There is no means of transcendence, redemption or 
liberation.  
 This is apparent in Watt if the couple of lines following 
Arsene’s definition of the “risus purus” are included in the 
discussion. Arsene describes the various laughs, defines the 
“risus purus,” and then states: 
 
Personally of course I regret all. All, all, all. Not a word, not a ----. 
But have I not been over that already? I have? Then let me speak rather 
of my present feeling, which so closely resembles the feeling of 
sorrow, so closely that I can scarcely distinguish between them.57 
 
Arsene is consumed with regret (“All, all, all”) and the feeling 
that he has now is neither sorrow nor happiness, but rather a 
feeling that “so closely resembles the feeling of sorrow” that he 
can “scarcely distinguish between them.” His regret collapses the 
distinction between feelings and leaves him with what he can 
only describe as that which “resembles” sorrow. Moreover, his 
awareness of the “risus purus” certainly does not permit 
“elevation,” “liberation” or “the lucidity of consolation.” He is 
trapped in a repetitive cycle centered around his “regret,” and this 
“regret” bleeds into his “present feeling”: “But have I not been 
over that already? I have?”   
 In Fin de Partie / Endgame (French 1957, English 1958), 
Nell makes a statement similar to that of Arsene, claiming that 
“Nothing is funnier than unhappiness, I grant you that.” This 
phrase is frequently taken out of context and placed all too 
 
57 Beckett, Watt, p. 47. 
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conveniently alongside Arsene’s definition of the “risus 
purus.”58 The dialogue from Endgame reads as follows: 
 
Nell:  [Without lowering her voice.] Nothing is funnier than  
  unhappiness, I grant you that. But -  
Nagg:  [Shocked.] Oh! 
Nell:  Yes, yes, it’s the most comical thing in the world. And we 
laugh, we laugh, with a will, in the beginning. But it’s always 
the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny story we have heard 
too often, we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more. 
[Pause.] Have you anything else to say to me? 59 
 
The “But –” is often omitted by critics in a hurry to simplify 
Nell’s statement. Following Nagg’s shocked interruption, Nell 
describes the hollowing of laughter, the sense in which, while 
“unhappiness” may be “the most comical thing in the world [...] 
in the beginning,” it becomes “like the funny story we have heard 
too often”: “we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more.” 
This laughter is neither redemptive nor transformative; it drains 
away over time, becoming terribly serious as the person laughing 
realizes that laughter is not pure, that the purity of the “risus 
purus” derives from the object of laughter, from “unhappiness.” 
For Dante, smiles and laughter in the Paradiso are ultimately an 
expression of pure joy at creation, at our creation by “l’amor che 
move il sole e l’altre stelle” (Par. 33. 145). In contrast, for 
Beckett, “unhappiness” and suffering are the bottom line of 
existence, and our laughter in response is always a complex 
“mixture” of pleasure and protest, bitterness and regret.  
 
58 See for example Rolf Breuer, ‘Paradox in Beckett’, The Modern Language 
Review, vol. 88: 3 (July, 1993), p. 572. 
59 Beckett, Endgame in The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber, 1986, repr. 
1990), p. 101. 
